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INTRODUCTION 
As many bettors will tell you, sports gambling is a complex 
endeavor. In an industry that generates more than three billion dollars 
annually from Nevada casinos alone,1 bettors perpetually search for 
an evaluative edge over bookmakers. Historically, the most successful 
handicappers2 in sports gambling have been those who consistently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gillian Spear, Think Sports Gambling Isn’t Big Money? Wanna Bet?, NBC 
NEWS (July 15, 2013), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20130718100409/http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/20
13/07/15/19439242-think-sports-gambling-isnt-big-money-wanna-bet. 
2 “Sports handicapping involves the process of determining which of two sports 
teams, if either, is favored in a specific event . . . . It can also pertain to sports that 
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apply a set of clearly defined principles.3 But figuring out exactly 
what rules to use, and how to use them, is no easy task when 
gambling, or in determining the legality of sports gambling. 
One recent Third Circuit ruling blocked New Jersey’s attempt to 
legalize sports gambling by upholding the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (PASPA). 4  The decision questions the 
controlling analytical framework for one of the most significant 
modern developments of constitutional law: the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.5 Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari and 
allowed the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine to stand. In doing so, the Court significantly hedged on the 
doctrine’s utility.  
This Note addresses the consequences of the Third Circuit’s 
decision to uphold the affirmative mandate requirement in PASPA,6 
concluding that PASPA does not comport with the 
anti-commandeering doctrine. Part I begins with an analysis of the 
case underlying the Third Circuit’s ruling and PASPA’s legislative 
background. Part II explores the genesis and evolution of the anti-
commandeering doctrine through three important Supreme Court 
cases.7 Part III sets out an argument for why PASPA’s affirmative 
mandate requirement is unsupported by precedent and inapposite to 
the anti-commandeering doctrine on textual, intentionalist, and 
structural grounds. Part IV examines consequences that might arise if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
feature individuals such as car racing, tennis and golf. . . .” What is Sports 
Handicapping?, LIVEBETTING.NET, http://www.livebetting.net/sports-betting-
guide/sports-handicapping/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
3 See Ian Thomsen, The Story of the Computer Group, OFFSHOREBETTOR.COM, 
http://www.offshorebettor.com/images/COMPUTER.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 
2015) (featuring one example of how a successful handicapper applied clearly 
defined principles).  
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (1992); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of 
New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3rd Cir. 2013) (upholding PASPA). 
5 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d 208, 229-34 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
6 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (1992).  
7 This group of cases includes Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992). 
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courts are asked to enforce federal bans that prevent state 
governments from regulating citizens’ conduct. Finally, Part V 
concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court erred in passing on the 
opportunity to reject PASPA’s affirmative mandate requirement. 
I. BACKGROUND  
In denying certiorari, the Court declined an opportunity to 
define the contours of the anti-commandeering doctrine by failing to 
explicitly reemphasize its analytical test: whether Congress seeks to 
control or influence the manner in which states regulate citizens’ 
conduct.8 This test reflects the approach of scholars who urge the 
Court to impose a heightened level of scrutiny for congressional acts 
that allow Congress to control or influence state legislatures. 9 
Heightened scrutiny in this context would add another prophylactic 
layer against federal commandeering to protect the underlying 
principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment. 
A. New Jersey’s Referendum to Legalize Sports Gambling and the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
In 2011, New Jersey citizens voted in favor of a nonbinding 
referendum to repeal a state law prohibiting sports gambling within 
state borders.10 The referendum was the only measure to appear on the 
ballot; it passed with a commanding consensus at the polls and 
amended the state’s constitution. “‘The voters beat the over-under,’” 
said New Jersey Senator Raymond Lesniak.11 “‘It was a bigger win 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Reno, 528 U.S. at 148-50. 
9 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: 
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2256 (1998). 
10 MaryAnn Spoto, Sports Betting Backed by N.J. Voters, NJ.COM (Nov. 9, 
2011, 6:02 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/nj_residents_vote_on_legalizin.html. 
11 Id. The term “over-under” refers to a kind of betting called a “totals bet,” 
where bettors guess in advance whether the total points scored in a particular game 
will exceed the number set by bookmakers. See, e.g., Allen Moody, Sports Betting-
Understanding Totals, SPORTSGAMBLING.COM, 
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than we expected. There’s a strong momentum to fight the federal ban 
in New Jersey.’”12  
Senator Lesniak was referring to PASPA, which Congress 
passed in 1992 to ban states from regulating sports gambling.13 
PASPA passed because Congress wanted to prevent state legislatures 
from attempting to repeal their own widespread bans on sports 
gambling.14 Before PASPA passed, however, the U.S. Department of 
Justice opposed the bill due to a concern that the bill implicated 
significant federalism issues by indirectly promulgating a federal ban 
on states’ legalization of sports gambling.15  
Notably, PASPA does not prohibit sports gambling by making it 
a violation of federal law.16 PASPA prevents “state governments from 
changing their state laws to legalize sports wagering—effectively 
freezing in place pre-existing state-law prohibitions.”17 The statute 
also makes clear that “a governmental entity 18  [cannot] sponsor, 
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact” 
sports gambling and its associated activities. 19  Thus, PASPA 
effectively prevents states from legalizing sports gambling despite the 
fact that Congress did not ban sports gambling under federal law.20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://sportsgambling.about.com/od/sportsgambling101/a/intrototals.htm (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2015). 
12 Spoto, supra note 10. 
13 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (1992). 
14 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4-5 (1991).  
15 See Brief for Appellants Christopher J. Christie, David L. ReBuck, & Frank 
Zanzuccki, at 9, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 
F.3d 208 (3rd Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1715).  
16 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04. 
17 Brief for Appellants, supra note 15, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
18 This language in PASPA implicates anti-commandeering jurisprudence, 
which centers on the crucial distinction between the federal government directly 
regulating citizens’ behavior and the federal government requiring state 
governments to regulate citizens’ behavior. See id. 
19 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1). 
20 Id. 
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B. New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law and National Collegiate 
Athletic Association v. Governor of New Jersey 
Following the referendum, and acting on the mandate of its 
constituency, the New Jersey state legislature passed the 
Sports Wagering Law21 to repeal its ban on sports gambling. The 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), along with Major 
League Baseball, the National Football League, the National 
Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League, 22 
subsequently filed suit in New Jersey District Court to prevent New 
Jersey from executing the Sports Wagering Law.23 The District Court 
found in favor of the NCAA and other sports leagues, ordering that 
New Jersey refrain from executing the Sports Wagering Law and 
maintain its prohibition on sports gambling.24 On appeal, in a 2-1 
panel decision, the Third Circuit ruled that PASPA was constitutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A-1 (2011). 
22 Major League Baseball, the National Football League, the National 
Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League are the four primary sports 
leagues in the United States based on total revenue, television revenue, attendance, 
and television viewership. See Soven Berry, NFL: Is the Most Popular Sports 
League in the U.S. Really Too Big to Fail?, BLEACHER REP. (July 17, 2013), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1707663-nfl-is-the-most-popular-sports-league-
in-the-usa-really-too-big-to-fail. 
23 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d 551, 553-55 
(D.N.J. 2013). As Congress noted when it passed PASPA, the four primary sports 
leagues’ opposition to legalized sports gambling stems from the belief that it 
“threatens to change the nature of sporting events from wholesome entertainment 
for all ages to devices for gambling [and] undermines public confidence in the 
character of professional and amateur sports.” S. Rep. No.  102-248, at 5 (1991). 
These concerns were amplified by the 2007 arrest and subsequent jailing of rogue 
NBA referee Tim Donaghy for fixing games and sharing inside information with 
illegal bookies. See Pat Jordan, After the Buzzer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/magazine/09FOB-Encounter-t.html?_r=0. 
However, given the recent proliferation of offshore sports gambling websites, it is 
not clear that such threats remain as palpable today as when Congress addressed 
them more than twenty years ago. 
24 See Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d at 553-55. 
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and upheld the District Court’s decision.25 However, Judge Thomas 
Vanaskie wrote in his dissenting opinion that PASPA is patently 
unconstitutional because it violates anti-commandeering principles 
inherent in the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.26  
C. The Third Circuit Ruling in National Collegiate Athletic 
Association v. Governor of New Jersey and its Impact on the 
Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
The Third Circuit’s ruling in National Collegiate Athletic 
Association v. Governor of New Jersey (NCAA)27 threatens the vitality 
of the anti-commandeering doctrine by reading into case law an 
affirmative mandate requirement that makes banning sports gambling 
little more than a phraseology problem for Congress to overcome. 
Imposing an affirmative mandate requirement in this context means 
that courts will find that a law violates the anti-commandeering 
doctrine only if it requires a state legislature to take affirmative 
legislative action. In other words, a law would not violate the anti-
commandeering doctrine under this view if it only requires a state 
legislature to refrain from taking legislative action. In fields such as 
gambling, where the conduct in question typically is prohibited unless 
state regulations provide otherwise,28 a prohibition by the federal 
government against state regulation of that conduct exerts direct 
control over how states regulate private parties.  
New Jersey faces no tenable or reasonable choice when 
confronted with its options under PASPA: the state legislature can 
either choose to keep on its books a state law that citizens expressly 
rejected, or allow all sports gambling within New Jersey’s borders to 
go wholly unregulated.29 Such a result implicates the very federalism 
concerns the U.S. Supreme Court sought to address when it animated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 
226-30 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
26 Id. at 241 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
27 Id. at 226-30. 
28 Brief for Appellants, supra note 15 at 46. 
29 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d. at 233. 
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the anti-commandeering doctrine: the federal government achieved its 
goal of banning sports gambling nationwide without passing federal 
legislation that did so directly, and thus without first finding support 
for such a ban in the U.S. Constitution.30 Meanwhile, the New Jersey 
legislature was left to bear the political liability of taking actions that 
did not respond to the will of its constituency.   
Specific pragmatic and normative problems with this view of 
the anti-commandeering doctrine loom on the horizon. First, the Third 
Circuit’ ruling forces states to choose between bearing the cost of the 
federal mandate imposed on them—which would involve expensive 
and exhaustive efforts to enforce anti-sports wagering laws—or 
opening the Pandora’s box of problems that would flow from states’ 
non-enforcement of those laws.31 The New Jersey legislature could 
also follow the mandate of its citizens by regulating sports gambling 
despite the Third Circuit’s ruling, but such action likely would cause 
systematic upheaval due to insufficient recourse mechanisms. 32 
Second, and even more concerning, the Third Circuit’s ruling puts the 
future viability of the anti-commandeering doctrine in doubt because 
Congress can simply rephrase an affirmative mandate to read as a 
negative prohibition whenever it wishes to control or influence the 
manner by which states regulate their citizens.33  
The majority opinion addressed this possibility directly, though 
its reasoning and result contradict the Third Circuit’s purported 
concern: 
To be sure, we take seriously the argument that many 
affirmative commands can be recast as 
prohibitions. . . . [But,] [t]he anti-commandeering 
principle may not be circumvented so 
easily. . . . PASPA does not say to states “you may 
only license sports gambling if you conscript your 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Id. at 245 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
31 Brief for Appellants, supra note 15, at 48. 
32 See Jackson, supra note 9, at 2253. 
33 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d. at 245 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  
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officials into policing federal regulations” or otherwise 
impose any condition that the states carry out an 
affirmative act or implement a federal scheme before 
they may regulate or issue a license. It simply bars 
certain acts under any and all circumstances.34 
In grounding its decision in the false dichotomy between an 
affirmative mandate and a negative prohibition, the Third Circuit 
merely sidestepped fundamental concerns underlying the Supreme 
Court’s development of the anti-commandeering doctrine. 
II. HISTORY OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE 
The U.S. Supreme Court introduced the anti-commandeering 
doctrine to further a constitutional interest in federalism by protecting 
the sovereignty of the various states.35 The doctrine’s fundamental 
suppositions stem from the notion that the federal government should 
not employ the various states as mechanisms to institute laws and 
policies at the whim of Congress.36 The doctrine supports this notion 
by maintaining the separate sphere of state sovereignty deliberately 
carved out for states by framers of the U.S. Constitution.37  
During the Constitutional Convention, the framers sought to 
maintain the dignity of states by insulating their autonomy as 
governing bodies. The framers also sought to ensure the federal 
government could only institute its preferred legislative agenda 
through channels expressly articulated in the Constitution. 38  In 
addition, the framers considered how to ensure the general electorate 
would not be confused about whether legislation derived from state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Id. at 233. 
35 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
36 See id.  
37 See id.; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-20 (1997). 
38 See New York, 505 U.S. at 180 (citing JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 
20 138 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)(“a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government 
over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from 
individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order 
and ends of civil polity.”)). 
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institutions with independent, law-making authority, or from a federal 
legislative puppeteer.39 Furthermore, the Supreme Court introduced 
the anti-commandeering doctrine with these same concerns in mind.40  
The doctrine sets out a clearly defined prohibition against the 
proscription of state autonomy by federal auxiliaries through any 
command requiring states to regulate private parties according to 
federal orders.41 
A. New York v. United States 
 The Court first breathed life into the anti-commandeering 
doctrine in 1992 when it decided New York v. United States.42 At issue 
was the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 
1985 (LLRWPA)43—a federal statute passed by Congress to improve 
the monitoring and handling of radioactive waste. 44  LLRWPA 
required states to provide a safe means for disposing of radioactive 
waste generated on states’ land,45 and created a financial incentive for 
states to comply with its provisions by allowing states to issue a 
surcharge against any neighboring state that transmitted radioactive 
waste across state lines. 46  Conversely, LRWPA forced any state 
government that did not comply with the Act to take title of all 
radioactive waste within its borders that had not been properly 
disposed of by a certain date.47 The latter provision left state treasuries 
footing the bill for all damages incurred directly or indirectly by them 
in disposing of such waste after that date.48  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See id. at 168. 
40 See id.  
41 See id.; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-27. 
42 See New York, 505 U.S. at 145. 
43 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021e(d)(2)(c) (1985) (declared unconstitutional in part by 
New York, 505 U.S. 144).  
44 See New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51. 
45 42 U.S.C.A. at § 2021. 
46 See id.; New York, 505 U.S. at 152-53. 
47 See 42 U.S.C.A. at § 2021; New York, 505 U.S. at 153-54. 
48 See New York, 505 U.S. at 153-54. 
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 The Court in New York struck down LLRWPA’s take-title 
provision because it forced the New York government to choose 
between either accepting ownership over the radioactive waste, or 
“regulating according to the instructions of Congress.”49 The Court 
found this menu constitutionally deficient: if Congress forced New 
York to take title of the radioactive waste, it would have 
unconstitutionally commandeered a state government to act 
legislatively at the behest of Capitol Hill.50 But, the only alternative 
under the Act would have forced the New York legislature to adopt 
federal legislation as its own, which the Court found equally 
unconstitutional.51  
Specifically, the New York Court found that both options failed 
under the constraints of the Tenth Amendment and Article I of the 
Constitution because “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the 
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” 52 
Throughout its reasoning, the Court raised the policy consideration of 
governmental accountability.53 Its concern stemmed from the inherent 
risk in allowing the federal government to enact its preferred 
legislation through the medium of state legislatures. Such conduct 
would erect a buffer between state-level voters and the decision-
makers elected on their behalf.54 
Simply put, state-level voters would see their elected officials 
making laws according to the prescriptions of federal government 
representatives without regard to whether such laws are antithetical to 
the expressed will of voters.55 Meanwhile, federal officials could 
simply watch their preferred policies become law without fear of 
political blowback from an unhappy electorate.56 Such a course not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Id. at 175. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 175-76. 
52 Id. at 188. 
53 See id. at 165-70. 
54 See id. at 169. 
55 See id. (“Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, 
elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local 
electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”). 
56 Id. 
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only exposes state government officials to political discontent and 
other ramifications, but impermissibly allows federal government 
officials to have their cake and eat it too.  
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor made an 
intentionalist argument as well—positing that framers of the 
Constitution intended the federal government to act upon the people, 
rather than the states, in light of the failed Articles of Confederation.57 
Justice O’Connor explained further that the Framers specifically 
adopted the Virginia Plan over alternative accords, and that the 
Virginia Plan only authorized the federal government to govern 
citizens directly.58 In that way, the Court’s decision in New York v. 
United States clearly and emphatically denounced the proposition that 
Congress could act constitutionally in attempting to force state 
legislatures to implement federal laws, policies, and regulations.  
B. Printz v. United States 
A few years after it decided New York, the Supreme Court 
expanded the anti-commandeering doctrine in Printz v. United 
States.59 In Printz, the Court held that a piece of federal legislation 
called the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the Brady Act)60 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Id. at 163. 
58 Id. at 164. According to the New York Court: 
Under the Virginia Plan. . . Congress would exercise legislative 
authority directly upon individuals, without employing the States 
as intermediaries. . . .Under the New Jersey Plan… Congress 
would continue to require the approval of the States before 
legislating, as it had under the Articles of Confederation. . . . In 
the end, the Convention opted for a Constitution in which 
Congress would exercise its legislative authority directly over 
individuals rather than over States; . . . it rejected the New Jersey 
Plan in favor of the Virginia Plan. 
 Id. at 164-65 (citations omitted). 
59 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
60 18 U.S.C.A § 922(s)(6)(b)(i), (iii), (iv) (2006). 
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violated the Tenth Amendment. 61  The Brady Act required law 
enforcement officers at the state and local level to conduct 
background checks on people attempting to purchase handguns, 
pursuant to certain procedures.62  
In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia echoed Justice 
O’Conner’s intentionalist argument in New York63—noting that no 
historical basis existed to show Congress could force state 
governments to implement its preferred policies because Congress did 
not have any such authority during the nation’s formative post-
convention years.64 Justice Scalia also offered a textual argument, 
pointing out that the Constitution’s text does not provide for the 
enlistment of state legislatures or executives in federal programs.65 
Ultimately, the Court held that the Brady Act violated the anti-
commandeering doctrine specifically because Congress had offended 
the Tenth Amendment by conscripting state governments. 66 
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that one of the essential attributes 
of state sovereignty protected by the anti-commandeering doctrine is 
the right of all state governments to “remain independent and 
autonomous within their proper sphere of authority,” rather than 
become “puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”67  
C. Reno v. Condon 
The Court’s most recent clarification of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine came in Reno v. Condon68—a 2000 decision reached by the 
Court in which it broke from both New York and Printz to uphold a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 521 U.S. at 933-34. 
62 Id. at 902. 
63 See New York, 505 U.S. at 163.  
64 Printz, 521 U.S. at 909 (discussing early Congressional enactments and 
determining that they weighed against the assumption that Congress could 
commandeer state governmental machinery). 
65 Id. at 907. 
66 Id. at 909, 933-94. 
67 Brief for Appellants, supra note 15, at 47 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 928). 
68 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
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federal law in the face of a Tenth Amendment challenge.69 The law in 
question was the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA),70 which 
prohibited state departments of motor vehicles from disclosing 
personal information obtained by the departments in connection with 
motor vehicle records.71 The Court found that no commandeering 
concern existed because DPPA did not dictate how states regulated 
their citizens.72 Rather, the Court upheld DPPA on grounds that it 
governed states’ activities only to the extent that state officials were 
acting in a private market of information distribution, and not 
executing sovereign functions.73  
Particularly notable in the Reno opinion was a distinction the 
Court made between objective and subjective action. 74 
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained it as the difference between the 
prohibition of conduct at issue in Reno, and the affirmative 
requirements struck down in New York75 and Printz76: “[DPPA] does 
not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or 
regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the 
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals[.]”77 
Nonetheless, while factually distinguishing Reno from previous cases 
did facilitate the Court’s departure from preceding trends, the 
distinction did not carry determinative weight in the Court’s 
interpretive analysis.78 Rather, the Court plainly identified the relevant 
standard for applying the anti-commandeering doctrine:  
This case is instead governed by South Carolina v. 
Baker,79 in which a statute prohibiting States from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See id. at 150-51. 
70 18 U.S.C.A §§ 2721-25 (1994). 
71 See id. 
72 Reno, 528 U.S. at 150-51.. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 151. 
75 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
76 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
77 Reno, 528 U.S. at 151.  
78 See id. at 142. 
79 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
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issuing regulated bonds was upheld because it 
regulated state activities, rather than seeking to control 
or influence the manner in which States regulated 
private parties.80  
Thus, the controlling standard for whether a federal law violates 
the anti-commandeering doctrine is whether the law “seek[ing] to 
control or influence the manner in which States regulate[] private 
parties.”81 Some have read Reno to restrict the application of the anti-
commandeering doctrine to laws that require affirmative action from 
state governments, 82  but that reading misinterprets or misapplies 
Reno’s holding. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit relied on this incorrect 
interpretation when it upheld PASPA. In doing so, the Third Circuit 
reduced the anti-commandeering doctrine’s utility to the point of 
triviality, contravened otherwise correct interpretations of the 
Constitution’s history and text, and flouted the valuable policies of 
federalism upon which New York and Printz relied. 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE AFFIRMATIVE MANDATE REQUIREMENT 
 The anti-commandeering doctrine applies beyond the narrow 
scope of cases in which an act of Congress affirmatively requires a 
state legislature to enact legislation, as is evident from the Court’s 
foundational decisions in New York,83 Printz,84 and Reno,85 and from 
subsequent decisions relying on that triumvirate.86 Writing in dissent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Reno, 528 U.S. at 142. 
81 Id. 
82 See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 
F.3d 208, 233 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
83 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
84 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
85 528 U.S. at 141. 
86 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 
(2012) (striking down Congress’s attempt to expand Medicaid through the 
Affordable Care Act on grounds that, when state governments are unconstitutionally 
commandeered, “the two-government system established by the Framers would give 
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of the Third Circuit’s decision to uphold PASPA, Judge Vanaskie 
noted that regardless whether Congress seeks to “command[] the use 
of state machinery to regulate or command[] the nonuse of state 
machinery to regulate,” the Supreme Court has made clear that the 
Constitution does not “‘confer upon Congress the ability to require 
States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.’”87 Further, no 
justification for an affirmative mandate requirement exists in the 
textual and historical arguments that form the basis of the anti-
commandeering doctrine.88 Similarly, no such requirement should be 
read into the case law through which the doctrine developed. The 
principles and policies underlying the doctrine also militate against 
adding an affirmative mandate requirement.  
The affirmative mandate requirement lacks support at every 
level of constitutional interpretation, making its application in cases 
such as NCAA fundamentally flawed. Moreover, the requirement 
represents a palpable problem in modern constitutional jurisprudence. 
The Third Circuits’ reading of an affirmative mandate requirement 
into the anti-commandeering doctrine exemplifies this problem.89 In 
its interpretation, the Third Circuit all but condoned Congress’s 
hijacking of New Jersey’s legislature under the guise of a purported 
difference between “you must regulate” and “you cannot not 
regulate.” As a result, the Third Circuit’s holding left a damningly 
narrow approach to anti-commandeering cases that all but obviated 
the doctrine’s future efficacy.  
A. The Textual Basis for the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Does Not 
Support an Affirmative Mandate Requirement. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine does not appear in express 
language of the Constitution, but its principles are embedded in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
way to a system that vests power in one central government, and individual liberty 
would suffer.”). 
87 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 249 ( (Vanaskie, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 162). 
88 See id at 241-51 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
89 See id.  
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language concerning dual sovereignty that appears through the 
document.90 Further, the textual mooring of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine begins with the Tenth Amendment. 91  As a rule of 
construction, the Tenth Amendment must be read to exclude from 
Congress all powers except those specific enumerated and set forth in 
Article I, § 8. 92  Thus, Congress has no power to conscript the 
regulatory processes of state legislatures because no such power is 
expressly granted to Congress in the text of Article I, § 8.93  
Furthermore, other sections of text do provide express 
authorization for the federal government to employ state 
governmental entities directly. As noted by Justice Scalia in Printz, 
Article III, § 1 and Article VI, cl. 2 of the Constitution combine to 
“permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal 
prescriptions.”94 In turn, this textual analysis leads to an expressio 
unius argument: Because the Constitution outlines specific 
circumstances under which the federal government may commandeer 
state courts, but does not do so for Congress with regard to state 
legislatures, the Constitution does not allow Congress to commandeer 
state legislatures.95  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; art. IV, § 3; art. IV, § 4; art. V; see also 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 919 (“Although the States surrendered many of their powers to 
the new Federal government, they retained a residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty[.]’ This is reflected throughout the Constitution’s text.” (citing JAMES 
MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 245 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
91 For additional analysis on this point see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 157 (1992). 
92 Id.  
93 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
94 Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (emphasis in original). 
95 As an alternative to the interpretive approach, a “functionalist” scholar might 
argue that the Constitution should serve as a hierarchical mechanism for subjecting 
states to the power of the federal government, and that the federal government’s 
power to commandeer state governments should extend to all state branches. That 
approach differs from the interpretive approach demonstrated here because it is not 
grounded in the text specifying Congress’s authority over such matters. See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 Ga. St. U. 
L. Rev. 959, 1-25 (1997).  
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These kinds of implied limitations are what form the basis of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine’s textual support. 96  But, reading an 
affirmative mandate requirement into the anti-commandeering 
doctrine would unnecessarily abridge important limitations inherent in 
the Constitution’s text. For example, because the Tenth Amendment 
reserves all powers not expressly granted to Congress,97 allowing 
Congress to commandeer state legislatures through negative 
prohibitions would erode the strength of the Tenth Amendment’ s 
textual limitations. Moreover, because the Constitution grants 
Congress limited powers,98 and because only the federal government 
has the power to commandeer state courts, an affirmative mandate 
requirement would be antithetical to the Constitution’s textual 
framework. 
B. The Constitution’s History and the Framer’s Intent do Not Support 
an Affirmative Mandate Requirement. 
The intentionalist arguments relied on by the Court in 
New York99 and Printz100 point to historical justifications for the anti-
commandeering doctrine. As Justice O’Connor posited when writing 
for the New York Court, the Framers rejected the notion that Congress 
should have authority to commandeer state legislatures.101 Justice 
O’Connor pointed out that the Framers’ chose the Virginia Plan over 
the New Jersey plan as evidence of their intent to institute a system of 
governance in which “Congress would exercise its legislative 
authority directly over individuals rather than over States.”102 For that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; art. VI, cl. 2. 
97 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
98 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; art. VI, cl. 2.  
 
99 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-64 (1992). 
100 521 U.S. at 928. 
101 505 U.S. at 180. 
102 Id. at 165. 
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reason, “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon 
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”103 
Moreover, as Justice Scalia articulated in Printz, the driving 
reasoning behind the New York Court’s decision centered on the 
concept of dual sovereignty, and the structural protections it 
provides.104 The Framers chose to provide two distinct levels of 
government, state and federal, to prevent either level of government 
from accumulating excessive power.105 Moreover, in rejecting the 
New Jersey plan, the Framers expressly denied choosing a system in 
which the federal government could regulate through the states.106  
Allowing Congress to prohibit state legislatures from regulating 
their citizens would offend the Framers in the same vein as allowing 
Congress to require state legislatures to enact legislation; in both 
instances, Congress would be exercising legislative authority over 
states rather than people.107 Moreover, reading an affirmative mandate 
requirement into the anti-commandeering doctrine cannot be justified 
in light of the history and intent of the Framers to provide a system of 
dual sovereignty. Thus, no form of Congressional commandeering of 
state legislatures—whether by affirmative mandate, or negative 
prohibition—can comport with the intent of the Framers in adopting 
the Constitution.  
Furthermore, drawing a distinction between affirmative 
mandates and negative prohibitions in the context of Congressional 
commandeering of state legislatures nullifies important structural 
protections inherent in the concept of dual sovereignty. Certainly 
Congress’s power would be “augmented immeasurably” if Congress 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Id. at 166. 
104 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. 
105 See id. at 921. “This separation of the two spheres is one of the 
Constitution’s structural protections of liberty. ‘Just as the separation and 
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to 
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance 
of power between the States and the Federal government will reduce the risk of 
tyranny and abuse from either front.’” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
458 (1991)). Id. 
106 See New York, 505 U.S. at 164. 
107 See id. 
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could regulate any activity typically requiring state authorization 
simply by prohibiting states from authorizing that activity 108 —
Congress would have the ability to proscribe individual conduct 
without first passing legislation that makes the conduct illegal. For 
that reason, tipping the balance of power so far in favor of the federal 
government would directly contravene the very notions of federalism 
the Supreme Court sought to protect with the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.109  
C. Anti-Commandeering Case Law Does Not Establish an Affirmative 
Mandate Requirement 
Judge Vanaskie’s dissenting opinion in NCAA highlights the 
problems with gleaning an affirmative mandate requirement from the 
case law. 110  First, as previously noted, the distinction Justice 
Rehnquist drew in Reno between affirmative requirements and 
negative proscriptions was not determinative in that case. 111 
Moreover, in context, Justice Rehnquist’s factual distinction did not 
harm the anti-commandeering doctrine or its underlying principles of 
federalism:  
First, the Court recognized that “the DPPA d[id] not 
require the States in their sovereign capacity to 
regulate their own citizens . . . .” Second, the Court 
explained . . . that “the DPPA regulates the States as 
owners of data bases” of personal information in motor 
vehicle records.112  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. 
109 See id.  
110 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 
208, 241-51 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Vanaskie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
111 See id.; Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 142 (2000). 
112 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 249 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting  Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000)). 
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The clear implication from Reno is that a federal law may 
impermissibly commandeer state legislatures if it either requires states 
to regulate their own citizens, or if Congress is establishing a 
regulatory scheme, regardless of whether the federal law mandates or 
prohibits state legislative conduct. Rather, the controlling test from 
Reno asks whether a federal law forces states to regulate their 
constituents in a certain manner—be it through forcing states to enact 
prescribed legislation, or forcing states to regulate absolutely by 
prohibiting them from authorizing specific conduct.113 The Court’s 
2012 decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius 114  bolsters this interpretation. Seven justices (three in 
plurality, and four in dissent) struck down a provision of the 
Affordable Care Act that withheld funding to the point of coercion 
from states that did not expand Medicaid eligibility requirements 
pursuant to certain federal regulations.115 As Judge Vanaskie pointed 
out, the decision relied on federalism principles espoused in New 
York, and gave “a clear signal from the Court that those principles 
enunciated in New York are not limited to a narrow class of cases in 
which Congress specifically directs a state legislature to affirmatively 
enact legislation.”116 
D. The Need for Governmental Accountability Counsels Against an 
Affirmative Mandate Requirement 
One of the primary policy concerns underlying the anti-
commandeering doctrine is the notion of governmental accountability. 
The need for governmental accountability arises out of the democratic 
interaction between state and federal governments, and harkens back 
to notions of dual sovereignty in the text and structure of the 
Constitution.117 The crux of the concern centers on accountability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See 528 U.S. at 142. 
114 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
115 Id. at 2585. 
116 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 244 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
117 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). 
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mechanisms that necessarily exist between legislators and the citizens 
who elect them. For example, when a constituency elects someone to 
a legislative body, voters generally expect that person to work on their 
behalf.118 In turn, citizens must preserve their right to revoke through 
election the representative capabilities of legislators who do not act 
according to their constituency’s interests.119  
Another fundamental tenet of government accountability 
involves maintaining an adequately empowered voting block of 
citizens who each have access to information regarding policies 
supported and opposed by their representatives.120 Simply put, voters 
must know who is responsible for policies that affect them so they can 
make informed choices when voting for representatives. When the 
federal government bans a given activity, for example, voters should 
be aware that the ban resulted from the federal government’s 
democratic legislative process. Similarly, voters should know when a 
state government bans an activity based on that state’s democratic 
will so they can determine with confidence who is responsible for the 
policy.  
However, problems with governmental accountability arise 
when the lines of transparency between a policy and those charged 
with its implementation become blurred. 121  When the federal 
government legislates through the apparatus of a state legislature, for 
example, the balance of decisional accountability is thrown askew:122 
Federal representatives can escape potential political blowback while 
seeing their policies implemented regardless.123 Meanwhile, Congress 
can claim credit for solving problems despite budgetary constraints by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See id.  
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See id.  
122 See id. A cynic’s response might call into question the actual knowledge and 
participation of the general electorate, particularly with respect to the procedural 
legislative background of a given law. But, because legislative deception often 
shields informed and engaged citizens from ulterior governmental motives, the 
cynic’s argument becomes self-perpetuating when applied to decisional 
accountability. 
123 See id. 
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not spending the federal tax dollars needed for the federal government 
to institute Congressional legislation. Conversely, voters would see 
their own state legislature as the operational force behind the policy 
and act accordingly, unaware that the political agency for the law 
actually lies with Congress.124 As a result, state legislators would face 
direct political ramifications for policies over which they have no 
actual control, and may not even support. This is the concern the 
Court had in mind when it animated the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.125 
Additional problems with government accountability arise in 
light of the affirmative mandate requirement, which does not comport 
with the anti-commandeering doctrine. Governmental accountability 
erodes anytime state legislatures carry out the policy determinations 
of Congress because such actions amount to the federal government 
imposing its will on the people without actually passing laws.126 And, 
as Justice O’Connor reiterated in New York, “[w]here the federal 
government directs the States to regulate, . . . the federal officials who 
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the 
electoral ramifications of their decision.”127 Accordingly, and as a 
leading scholar pointed out:  
[T]he distinction between affirmative duties and 
negative prohibitions makes little sense in terms of the 
underlying goals of the Court’s Tenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence . . . . [If] the Court’s concern is that 
federal mandates frustrate accountability because 
voters do not know who is responsible for 
governmental action, that is as true with prohibitions as 
affirmative duties.128 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. 
127 Id. 
128 Erwin Chemerinsky, Right Result, Wrong Reasons: Reno v. Condon, 25 
OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 823, 827-28 (2000). 
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An affirmative mandate requirement threatens governmental 
accountability because it provides a way for the federal government to 
install its policies through state legislative regulation while avoiding 
democratic consequences. Moreover, governmental accountability is 
one of the foundational justifications of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine. Thus, an affirmative mandate requirement cannot be read 
into the anti-commandeering doctrine.  
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AN AFFIRMATIVE MANDATE REQUIREMENT 
As laid out by the majority in NCAA,129 the options under 
PASPA for the state legislature of New Jersey can hardly be described 
as such. By allowing Congress to prohibit states like New Jersey from 
regulating sports gambling,130 the Third Circuit pigeonholed states into 
either bearing the cost of investigations, prosecutions, and 
incarcerations that stem from illegal gambling arrests, or neglecting to 
enforce state laws prohibiting sports gambling. Or, state legislatures 
might simply refuse to abide by PASPA because of its intrusive and 
impractical nature. In any case—and as these so-called options 
highlight—Congressional action that seeks to influence or determine 
how states regulate their own citizens presents a unique set of 
problems. Nonetheless, these problems could be avoided by requiring 
Congress to pass and execute its own regulatory legislation, consistent 
with current anti-commandeering jurisprudence. 
A. Enforcement of Sports Gambling Laws Burdens State Law 
Enforcement Departments 
States that choose to enforce the sports gambling laws on their 
books often face a daunting and unproductive task. As journalist Tim 
Layden noted, “Busting gambling rings is labor-intensive work for 
law enforcement agencies, and there’s little chance that those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 
213-41 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
130 See id. 
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apprehended and found guilty will receive heavy penalties since much 
of the public considers gambling a victimless crime.”131 In other 
words, because perpetrators rarely receive extended jail sentences (if 
they receive jail time at all),132 state law enforcement agencies have 
little incentive to bear these costs. Accordingly, law enforcement 
agencies often choose to forego enforcement of the governing sports 
wagering prohibitions in their states.133 In 2011, for example, New 
Jersey officers reported making only 103 arrests for illegal gambling, 
of which a significant portion likely were attributable to underage 
gambling convictions—not illegal gambling ring busts.134 Moreover, 
eight of New Jersey’s twenty-one counties did not report making a 
single arrest for gambling that year.135  
Thus, real fiscal and practical pressures are leading states to 
decline enforcement of state gambling laws rather than spend even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Tim Layden, Bettor Education, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 3, 1995), 
http://si.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1006405/2/index.htm. Arguments against 
the view of sports gambling as a victimless crime often hinge on gambling’s 
funding and, thus, the facilitation of organized crime. See Justin Engel, Saginaw 
Police Say Illegal Gambling “Not a Victimless Crime”, MLIVE.COM (Sept. 30, 
2011), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/saginaw/index.ssf/2011/09/more_than_just_a_game_sa
ginaw.html. These arguments serve as policy justifications for the legalization of 
state-sponsored sports gambling, which would likely ameliorate instances of 
gambling-funded crime and gambling-related violence. 
132 Layden, supra note 131. While it is true that other so-called victimless 
crimes like prostitution can lead to stiff criminal sentences for convicts running 
extensive rings, such crimes typically are distinguishable because they are 
uniformly prohibited across the country. Instead, because sports gambling is 
permitted in some states but not others, a more appropriate analog might be found in 
future prosecutions for the sale and distribution of marijuana, which recently 
became legal in Colorado and Washington. See Star-Ledger Editorial Board, 
Legalize Sports Gambling? NJ Follows States with Legal Pot, NJ.COM (June 26, 
2014, 9:14 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/06/legalize_sports_gambling_nj_follows
_states_with_legal_pot_editorial.html. 
133 Layden, supra note 131. 
134 N.J. ST. POLICE, ST. & CNTY. ARREST SUMMARY 74 (2011), available at 
http://www.njsp.org/info/ucr2011/pdf/2011_sect_3.pdf. 
135 Id. at 54-55. 
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more time and money trying to enforce them. This election to non-
enforcement may save state law enforcement agencies both time and 
money. Still, non-enforcement of state gambling laws presents several 
practical and legal problems of its own in the context of 
Congressional commandeering. 
B. Non-Enforcement is Not a Suitable Alternative to Direct 
Congressional Regulation of Sports Gambling 
In NCAA, the Third Circuit found that non-enforcement of a 
state ban on sports gambling did not constitute an “authoriz[ation] by 
law” of sports gambling.136 The finding ran counter to appellants’ 
argument that a state’s declaration of non-enforcement would 
automatically violate PASPA because, in effect, such a declaration 
would authorize sports gambling. 137  However, the Third Circuit 
justified its finding on grounds that the New Jersey legislature would 
need to take additional action before the state’s non-enforcement of 
sports gambling constituted an authorization by law of sports 
gambling.138 
First, the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the statutory language 
“authorization by law”139 is not reasonable. Under the plain language 
of PASPA, any state official who announced that a particular law 
would no longer be enforced would, for all intents and purposes, 
authorize by law the conduct in question because, such an 
announcement would allow citizens to engage in the conduct without 
fear of legal repercussion.140 In contrast, the Third Circuit’s self-
triggering interpretation of the express authorization language in 
PASPA effectively requires enforcement. 141  As such, state law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 
232 (3rd Cir. 2013).  
137 See id.  
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 227. 
140 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (1992). 
141 Brief for Appellants, supra note 15, at 48. 
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enforcement agencies have no choice but to bear the various burdens 
of enforcing their states’ existing sports gambling laws. 
 Alternatively, and assuming non-enforcement is still a viable 
option under the Third Circuit’s interpretation, states pursing that 
option would still face several problems. First, Congressional acts that 
coerce states into non-enforcement of state laws necessarily engender 
state–constitutional conflicts. As the appellants in NCAA noted, “as a 
matter of state law, state officials have a responsibility to enforce 
their own laws.”142  
State officials also must practically consider how citizens might 
respond to a promise of non-enforcement. For example, some citizens 
might be deterred from engaging in the conduct because, despite a 
promise of non-enforcement, the conduct would still be illegal. 
Distrust also could result between state governments and their 
constituents if citizens are prone to suspect they are being set up to 
violate a law that remains on the books.143 Congressional acts also 
might carry legislation-specific problems that cause citizens to remain 
impacted by a law, despite a state or local non-enforcement policy.144 
In New Jersey, for example, citizens might hesitate to violate the 
sports gambling ban if they considered the related infractions under 
federal wiretapping statutes and other federal laws that piggyback off 
New Jersey’s gambling laws.145  
 Another option proposed by the Third Circuit was that states 
could completely retreat from regulating the field in question.146 That 
means New Jersey could simply decline to regulate any sports 
gambling whatsoever within its borders by repealing the state ban and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 11 (providing that the New Jersey 
governor must “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”) (emphasis in 
original)).  
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 Id. Also, New Jersey law does not provide for the enforcement of a 
gambling debt incurred through non-sanctioned sports gambling, so it is unclear 
whether successful bettors would be able to collect from strong-arming bookies in a 
New Jersey court. Id. 
146 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 
208, 235 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
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enacting no further legislation in its place. Because there is no federal 
legislation regulating the activity, however, pursing this option would 
leave citizens completely uninhibited in fields of conduct that 
typically require licensing by states.147 It would also leave broad 
swaths of citizen activity beyond the reach of governmental 
regulation.  
This last option would be particularly problematic for an activity 
such as gambling, which implicates longstanding connections 
between New Jersey citizens and the organized crime syndicates who 
have been illegally sponsoring and booking bets for years. 148 
Politically speaking, allowing these illicit gambling operations to 
proceed unfettered would be akin to lining the pockets of 
organizations that engage in detrimental behavior ranging from “sex 
[and heroin] trafficking” to “extort[ing] businesses and [murder].”149 
Therefore, short of effective anarchy, the states essentially are stuck—
they must leave the sports gambling laws already on the books 
unenforced by executives or law enforcement departments in that 
state.  
C. Federal Enforcement of Prohibitions Against State Regulation of 
Citizens Might Prove Difficult 
Prohibitions like that in PASPA are so antithetical to core 
constitutional values, and carry such vivid political consequences for 
state legislators, one can easily imagine a scenario in which a state 
legislature attempts to use legislation to override an injunction like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Brief for Appellants, supra note 15, at 48. 
148 See Stayton Bonner, Modern Mafiosi, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2011), 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2011/01/modern_mafiosi.html. 
149 See id. As a policy matter, the funding of mafia activity through gambling 
bolsters New Jersey’s argument in favor of legalizing state-sponsored betting. Id. 
Mobs currently turn massive profits because of an explosive proliferation of online 
gambling. The argument that legalization of state-sponsored gambling would 
constrict mafia treasure chests is notable because it hinges on the premise that 
gamblers would prefer the stability and security of placing bets with a local 
government institution rather than with a shadowy offshore satellite operation. See 
id. 
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that granted against New Jersey. As scholar Vicki Jackson noted, 
however, the complications such a scenario might generate are 
murky—particularly given the equitable nature of injunctions and the 
composition of the parties likely to be involved.150 Nonetheless, the 
fact that state legislatures as collective bodies might violate an 
injunction issued by the state courts presents one clear problem with 
regard to the pursuit of recourse.151 Responding to this concern, 
Jackson wrote that some “features of legislative action may justify 
treating it as peculiarly protected from ‘outside’ mandates for action. . 
. . [T]he front-line enforcement mechanisms for ‘law’ in our legal 
system and culture are courts, and judicial enforcement of judgments 
against collective bodies like legislatures poses difficulties….”152 
Thus, the logistical and legal problems that would arise if courts tried 
to hold state legislatures in contempt for violating an injunction 
demonstrate that state legislative bodies were uniquely structured to 
preclude commandeering by Congress. 
V. NCAA AND THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court could have reversed the Third Circuit’s 
decision in NCAA insofar as it relied on an affirmative mandate 
requirement to find that PASPA does not violate the anti-
commandeering doctrine. Moreover, while the Third Circuit paid lip 
service to a potential for manipulation via phraseology,153 the majority 
opinion failed to protect adequately against the linguistic abuse of 
constitutional federalism. As a result, PASPA dictates how states such 
as New Jersey must regulate sports gambling,154 and is therefore not 
constitutional. Instead, the Court could have struck down the Third 
Circuit’s decision, and could have clarified further the contours of the 
frequently-debated anti-commandeering doctrine.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 See Jackson, supra note 9 at 2253. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. at 2251. 
153 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 
208, 232 (3rd Cir. 2013).  
154 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (1992). 
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Specifically, the Court missed an opportunity to emphasize that 
the more precise controlling test for the doctrine, which was set forth 
in Baker and applied in Reno, is whether Congress seeks to control or 
influence the manner in which states regulate citizens’ conduct.155 
This test is preferable to the affirmative mandate requirement because 
it is easily applied and comports with the constitutional justifications 
of the anti-commandeering doctrine.156 Furthermore, the Reno test 
captures the policies of federalism that illuminate the anti-
commandeering doctrine—particularly dual sovereignty and 
governmental accountability. 
 In advocating for an alternative to a bright-line rule against 
legislative commandeering, one scholar suggested a “presumption 
that federal directives to state legislatures are not ‘Necessary and 
Proper’ if the same goal can be accomplished through other means, 
such as direct federal regulation.”157 Such a presumption would be 
most effective in complementing the very bright-line rule advocated 
for here: because of the unique concerns regarding accountability and 
judicial recourse that accompany legislative commandeering,158 any 
acts of Congress that present a risk of legislative commandeering 
should trigger an automatic increase in the level of scrutiny applied. 
Adding this analytical step would not only provide an extra layer of 
protection to what is currently the most vulnerable aspect of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine, but would also shore up both the 
doctrine’s jurisprudence and its federalism-based values. Moreover, in 
reasserting a commitment to the anti-commandeering doctrine, the 
Court could also enhance lower courts’ reliance on its rulings by 
making more explicit its operational components.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 142 (2000); South Carolina v. Baker, 
485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
156 See Reno, 528 U.S. 150-51. 
157 See Jackson, supra note 9 at 2253. 
158 See id.  
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CONCLUSION 
The anti-commandeering doctrine plays an important role in 
modern constitutional thought. The Court’s recent revitalization of 
federalism values and the structural significance of those values to the 
Constitution signal a deliberate shift in the prevailing intellectual 
prism of constitutional interpretation. 159  However, the anti-
commandeering doctrine is only viable as a mechanism to protect 
dual sovereignty and governmental accountability if it applies in all 
situations where Congress attempts to control how states regulate 
their citizens.160 The inclusion of an affirmative mandate requirement 
would contravene the textual, historical, and structural foundations of 
the anti-commandeering doctrine found in the Constitution, and 
would run counter to the recent case law through which the doctrine 
has developed.161  
Allowing a dilution of the anti-commandeering doctrine through 
inclusion of an affirmative mandate requirement would lead to 
negative consequences similar to those seen in NCAA:162 states would 
face the unacceptable choice between complete deregulation of a 
suspect field of conduct, or complete non-enforcement of state laws 
(if they have a choice at all). Beyond the practical and theoretical 
problems in these so-called choices, other uneasy questions loom 
about the efficacy of legal recourse in the event a state legislature 
breaks an injunction such as that handed down by the Third Circuit in 
NCAA.163 Ultimately, the Court erred by not overruling NCAA, and by 
failing to hold that the proper standard for evaluating anti-
commandeering cases is whether Congress seeks to control or 
influence the manner in which states regulate citizens’ conduct.164 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 See Reno, 528 U.S. 141; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
160 See Reno, 528 U.S. 141; Printz, 521 U.S. at 898; New York, 505 U.S. at 144. 
161 See Reno, 528 U.S. at 141; Printz, 521 U.S. at 898; New York, 505 U.S. at 
144. 
162 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 
208, 223 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
163 See id. 
164 See Reno, 528 U.S. at 142. 
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This is the preferable standard; it is grounded in the same 
constitutional bases as the anti-commandeering doctrine itself and it 
provides an easily applicable framework that protects the policies 
underlying the doctrine. 
The values protected by the anti-commandeering doctrine are 
those of federalism, dual sovereignty, and political accountability.165 
A test that evaluates whether Congress is attempting through legal 
manipulation to coerce states into regulating citizens in a certain 
manner properly channels these values by ensuring that Congress will 
act directly on the people rather than the states. This test would also 
ensure that state governments continue to play their valuable role as 
the parallel protectors of individual rights. And, by requiring that all 
laws be generated directly by the people instead of by Congress, the 
test would help preserve direct lines of accountability between state 
governments and citizens. Moreover, imposing a presumption of 
invalidity in cases involving any act of Congress that seeks to 
commandeer state legislatures would erect an additional prophylactic 
measure against all forms of commandeering.  
Like sports gambling itself, the key to maintaining the anti-
commandeering doctrine’s vitality is the consistent application of 
correctly formulated principles. The Supreme Court erred when it 
condoned an interpretation of the anti-commandeering doctrine that is 
antithetical both to the doctrine’s policy goals, and to its constitutional 
and precedential groundings. Instead, the Supreme Court should have 
seized the opportunity to clarify the contours of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine and to emphasize the doctrine’s correct 
evaluative framework. 
Finally, the Third Circuit’s interpretation that anti-
commandeering precedent requires an affirmative mandate to render 
unconstitutional the conscription by Congress of state legislatures 
threatens to destroy the anti-commandeering doctrine altogether.  
But, hindsight is 20/20 in both gambling and constitutional 
jurisprudence, of course. Advocates of federalism and dual 
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sovereignty now see with unfortunate clarity: NCAA166 was a bet on 
the wrong horse.  
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